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Saturday, June 19, 2010

Challenges to the Argument

Chapter 3F

Challenges to the Argument


In a survey the journal Science did in 1964 by, only 16% of the science Ph.D.s who responded agreed with President Kennedy’s decision to go to the Moon, while an overwhelming 64% disagreed. It was generally felt then that the Apollo Program was undertaken mainly for political reasons.[1] Ever since, many scientific and other critics have questioned the scientific value of space exploration.

The point is that my serendipity argument depends on a close connection between space exploration and science. If this connection is brought into question, my argument is also brought into question.

According to a second objection, it is not enough to show that the scientific exploration of space is serendipitous. We are still required to show that such exploration is likely to produce greater serendipity than competing activities, including other types of scientific exploration.

Let me describe these objections in greater detail.


1. Space exploration does not involve fundamental science in a significant way.

The first objection goes something like this: what my argument shows, strictly speaking, is that changes in fundamental science lead to a different panorama of problems, solutions and opportunities, hence the serendipity of science. Such changes have the desired effect because fundamental science gives us a way of viewing the universe and of interacting with it.

It is not clear, however, that applied or peripheral science would have similar effects. And to these critics it seems that the science done in the pursuit of space exploration is for the most part applied or peripheral.[2] This is not to say that space exploration is not likely to produce serendipity of some sort, for obviously it already has. The point is rather that the significance of what space exploration will accomplish is much less than I have made it out to be. Yes, we will have some interesting though marginal science and lots of gadgets, but no radical transformations of our main points of view.

Two considerations may tempt us to dismiss this objection summarily. The first is that it assumes too regal a status for fundamental or pure science as compared to applied science and technology. A moment’s thought makes us realize that “gadgets” have often driven revolutionary developments in fundamental or pure science: lasers are pivotal instruments in the study of fusion; personal computers have enabled the launching of hitherto undreamed-of theoretical work in many scientific disciplines, from mathematical physics to neuropsychology; and let us not forget the most famous influential gadget in the history of science, Galileo’s telescope, which was invented as a toy in Holland. It is clear, then, that transformations in technology and “applied science” can create a new panorama of problems and opportunities for the practice of fundamental science.

Nevertheless, I will not take the easy way out offered by this consideration. The science done in space exploration runs the gamut from the most applied to the most fundamental, as I hope to show in the rest of the book, and thus it brings out the deep practicality of science in its fullest sense.

The second consideration is that the critic who belittles the scientific value of space exploration is perhaps a bit of a straw man: space science is far more respectable now than in the days of President Kennedy. Three reasons, however, should keep us from deriving much reassurance from this consideration.

The first reason is that not all space science is now respectable, as we will see shortly. In any event, it is important to understand why that shift of perception took place in the fields of space science where it did.[3] The second reason is the need to address the nagging suspicion that some space research has gained prominence purely because the Government has thrown big money to support it. If this suspicion is correct, society's quest for space exploration has distorted the practice of science. The third reason is that even if, contrary to fact, most scientists did have a high opinion of most space science today, it would still be useful to state as bluntly as possible why someone might not agree. For in replying we stand to explain better why we ought to go into space.

Space science covers many fields, but for the purpose of this essay they can be subsumed under three main categories: planetary science, space physics and astronomy, and space biology. Let us see why their serendipity might seem questionable.


Take planetary science (under this rubric I am including comparative planetology and the scientific exploration of the solar system in general)[4]. Granted that by going into Earth orbit and looking down we can learn much about our own planet; but what can we learn about the Earth from looking at another planet? It would seem, as an early Greek might say, that if the other planet is different we are not learning about the Earth, and if it is like the Earth we should not waste effort going there when we might as well look at the Earth itself.[5]

As for space physics and space astronomy, how can they change our lives down here? It may be fascinating to find out what makes quasars burn; but, fascination aside, will that knowledge feed hungry children or at least make automobiles run more efficiently? We need to see how space physics and astronomy can come to be in a position similar to that of the revolution in physics that led to the laser and its use in medicine.


A critic might argue that lasers are built on fundamental principles of matter; on principles, furthermore, that apply right here on Earth. So there is no mystery why a revolution that gave us those principles had terrestrial applications. By going into deep space, by placing telescopes in orbit and all that, we might challenge our points of view and force them to change. But they are points of view about what is up there, not about what is down here. Or are they?

Space biology fares even worse, for many space scientists themselves see little value in it beyond the need to keep astronauts healthy. And since many of those scientists would prefer unmanned exploration, even this conditional value of space biology is in question. Such is a common verdict regarding the branch of space biology that investigates the behavior of terrestrial life in outer space. Another branch of space biology named exobiology (or “astrobiology”) presumably investigates extraterrestrial life. Under this rather cryptic description, exobiology became a target for critics who derided it, until the recent Mars meteorite controversy, on the grounds that, since we have never found extraterrestrial life, exobiology investigates nothing at all.[6]


I will provide replies in the next three chapters, one per field. It will become evident, however, that this division of space science is largely a matter of convenience, for there exist strong connections between the three fields. Indeed, the seeds for the answers to some of the questions pertaining to astronomy and biology will be planted in the discussion of planetary science.

2. The serendipity of space exploration need not be greater than that of other scientific enterprises.

If we are to support scientific exploration because its serendipity will reward us with the tools to improve life on Earth, are there no better candidates than space exploration? Consider oceanography, for example.[7] It is clear that the oceans play a crucial role in our climate and in the planet’s ability to sustain life. The benefits of understanding the oceans better thus seem quite direct. Shouldn’t oceanography then have greater priority than space exploration?


I offer two replies. The first is that I have never argued that space is the only stage for scientific exploration. In a well-run world, space exploration would be one of the important tasks human beings undertake, and perhaps some other scientific tasks should have even greater priority.

The second reply is that the priority of space is likely to be very high anyway. Consider the example of oceanography again. Clearly, obtaining knowledge of the oceans is very important to us. But as we will see in the following chapter, success in securing that sort of knowledge will require, at least in part, a global approach to the study of the oceans and the other systems with which they interact – a global approach for which space technology is exceptionally well suited. My suggestion is, then, that the majority of serious “competitors” to space exploration will actually be more successful if done in conjunction with space exploration.

Of course, I do not wish to claim that all space exploration is scientific. As space activities become routine, more and more of them turn into industrial enterprises or financial investments (e.g., satellite communications). The aim of this chapter was to provide a philosophical case, via serendipity, to justify the heart of space exploration.


In overcoming the objections, supporters of space exploration will be able to appropriate Descartes' words when claiming, for example, that space biology will contribute to medicine and thus bring about "the preservation of health, which is without doubt the chief blessing and the foundation of all other blessings in this life."[8] And in addition they may proudly look forward to the new mastery of nature with which space science will reward their efforts. For that mastery will lead to "the invention of an infinity of arts and crafts which [will] enable us to enjoy without any trouble the fruits of the earth and all the good things which are to be found there."[9] To the fruits of the earth, the supporters will say, space exploration promises to add the bounty of the universe.

NOTES



[1] Even some supporters of exploration agree. Ben Bova from the National Space Society writes in a letter to Science (Vol. 233, August 8, 1986, p. 610) that “The U.S. space program’s primary motivations are, and always have been, political and economic.” He also thinks that it is a myth “that the space program exists mainly for the purpose of scientific research.” I will have more to say on these views in Chapter 7.

[2] For an account of this attitude against space science, see my “Pecking Orders and the Rhetoric of Science,” Explorations in Knowledge, Vol. III, No. 2, 1986, reprinted in my Evolution and the Naked Truth, op. cit.

[3]. This attitude within science, as well as negative attitudes about science in the larger society, plays an important role in our evaluation of space policy and of specific proposals for funding space undertakings. This role is, however, seldom made explicit. We often have little more than a gut feeling about how priorities should be allocated. But would not a different idea of the nature of science – and of the nature of space science – influence our gut feeling?

[4] For an account of the low status the planetary sciences suffered until rather recently, see Stephen G. Brush, “Planetary Science: From Underground to Underdog,” Scientia, 1978, Vol. 113, p. 771. Brush demonstrates how the prejudice against planetary science was blind to the history of physics.

[5]. This might be the approach taken by a student of Xenophanes.

[6]. This popular opinion of the field has changed considerably since David McKay’s team’s analysis of a now famous Martian meteorite (ALH84001) suggested that there were traces of fossil life inside of it. NASA has capitalized on the public enthusiasm, even though most meteorite experts have been hostile to the hypothesis. This issue will be discussed in Chapter 6.

[7]. This point was suggested to me by Terry Parsons.

[8]. Descartes, Discourse on Method, Haldane and Ross, trans., op. cit., p. 120.

[9]. Ibid., p. 119.

Friday, June 11, 2010

From Serendipity to Justification

Chapter 3E

From Serendipity to Justification

Clearly, then, a dynamic science makes certain things possible that otherwise would be not only beyond our reach but also beyond our imagination. That is one of the main reasons why we cannot afford not to do science: many problems of which we are already aware cannot be solved unless a different point of view comes into play. Therefore to reject or slow down the process by which science grows, by which we refine and replace our communal spectacles, amounts to a decision to deprive ourselves of much that is good and to continue to expose ourselves unnecessarily to who knows what dangers[1].

Supporters of space exploration can now justify their expectation of a bounty from space precisely because exploration presents many challenges to our science and technology. Since space exploration is thus so likely to contribute to the transformation of our views, investing in it has a clear advantage over investing in fields not so ripe with challenge.


Knowing that serendipity is a natural consequence of science, the supporter of exploration may now say with Descartes that a failure to explore is a failure to carry out our obligation to "procure the general good of mankind." The justification the supporter can now offer for exploration in general, and for the heart of space exploration[2] in particular, sounds like a practical case, albeit more subtle and indirect than the one made in Chapter 2. But it is a practical case born out of the nature of space science itself, and thus the guarantees that it offers go well beyond those of historical anecdotes.


This deeper and fundamental practicality forms the basis of the supporter's response to the strongest social objections. The supporter of exploration can now explain to the social critic why the previous benefits of exploration were not a fortunate accident: they were the result of the inevitable expansion of opportunity that is part and parcel of scientific exploration. Once we understand the dynamic nature of science we are in a position to vouch for its future serendipity. As we saw in the previous chapter, to a casual observer the heart of space exploration may not appear to have obvious practical benefits. But this deeper investigation reveals a long-term, fundamental practicality: the practicality that comes when a transformation of our views of the universe expands our range of opportunity.

As the benefits from exploration become routine, the frontier of the unknown is pushed further out into the cosmos and our challenges shift accordingly. In indulging our enthusiasm, we are thus bound to force a change in our panorama of problems and opportunities.


The argument works against the ideological objection as well. Unless we commit species suicide, we will continue to interact with the Earth and transform it in small and large ways. By doing so we act in the manner of all other living beings: a tree grows tall and gives shade to violets and mushrooms that could not have lived without it; a beaver builds a dam, harming rose bushes and fish, but helping water lilies and frogs; and once upon a time, bacteria gave the Earth its oxygen and nitrogen atmosphere.

The question for us is not whether we will interfere, but rather how much and how wisely. Now, to act wisely we need knowledge of ourselves, of the Earth, and of our interactions with the Earth. Otherwise we are likely to impose too big a burden on the planet or on its human inhabitants.

Such knowledge is not complete as of this writing – not even environmental activists can reasonably claim that they know everything about our planet – and it may never be complete. That is, our perspective is limited, and therefore we need a dynamic science that can change our panorama of problems and opportunities. To eschew dynamic science is to deprive humankind of the chance to act wisely. We are already a big presence on the Earth and need to move carefully in the dark of our ignorance. It would thus be irresponsible to forgo the lanterns that may illuminate our way (lanterns such as NASA’s Mission to Earth, to be discussed in the next chapter). Space exploration is thus not a false panacea but an important means to a cleaner and better future.[3]



[1] We may also expose ourselves to new risks. I will discuss this matter in the last two chapters.

[2] Cf. the remarks made at the end of Ch. 2 about those aspects of exploration that fire the imagination and motivate the conquest of the cosmos.

[3]. Historians may point out that the argument sketched in the two previous sections of this chapter is largely based on history and so they may wonder about my remarks in Chapter 2 against a historical case for serendipity. The answer is that here I place the history of science in a philosophical context. Several of my premises do require the history of science for their support, but my conclusions are not the results of inductive inferences from history. They depend instead on conceptual inferences about the nature of science and exploration. This is what makes my argument philosophical.

Saturday, June 5, 2010

Scientific Exploration and Serendipity 2

Chapter 3D

Scientific Exploration and Serendipity 2

Second Part of the Argument: Scientific exploration leads to scientific change.

Changes in worldviews are inevitable given the nature of science. The reason is that worldviews (e.g., comprehensive scientific theories) are our creations and thus imperfect.[1] Therefore, they are always in need of refinement, modification, or replacement.

The pressure for such changes comes from the exposure both to unusual circumstances (which force us to stretch our views) and to competing ideas (which are often developed to account for a few of those unusual circumstances, and then extended to explain the entire field). And – here is a key point – scientific exploration, by its very nature, places science in new circumstances and presents it with new ideas. Thus scientific exploration leads not merely to the addition of a few, or even many, interesting facts but to the transformation, perhaps the radical transformation, of our views of the world.

Let me rephrase this second part of the argument in schematic form:

6. Science is dynamic. Science is always changing because

(a) It is never complete (being a human creation).


(b) When challenged by new circumstances it must adapt (i.e., change). For example, cancer and AIDS have challenged scientists to alter profoundly our ideas about cell functioning and development. And astronomy has undergone many radical changes motivated, in great part, by new instruments that have allowed us to look at hitherto unimagined aspects of the universe (e.g., Galileo’s telescope and the discovery of the phases of Venus and the moons of Jupiter, as well as the recent upheaval created by the discoveries made with the new generations of telescopes).

(c) When challenged by new ideas, it is, once again, spurred to change. Think of the radical transformation of biology as the result of Darwin’s idea of natural selection.


7. Scientific exploration places science in new circumstances and presents it with new ideas.

This is true almost by definition. When we explore scientifically, we either move science into new areas or else think about it in a new way (i.e., in the light of new ideas). I say “almost” for two reasons. First, even though I am presenting a conceptual argument, I do not wish to engage in a semantic dispute. Perhaps someone might give an example in which a scientist explores without placing science in new circumstances or thinking about science anew. Nevertheless, these two activities cover the range of what scientific exploration characteristically does (in a strong sense of “characteristic”). This is why I aim for the conclusion that serendipity is a natural consequence of scientific exploration, where by “natural consequence” I mean a (strongly) characteristic or practically inevitable consequence. A practically inevitable consequence of having a human genome is to be born with one head, one heart, two eyes, and two legs. But some humans are born with only one leg, say, and some human embryos do not even get to be born.

The second reason is that some very scholarly critics may feel that “exploration” is too romantic a name for what scientists do. Scientists presumably ponder, observe, investigate, and carry out experiments, but they are explorers only in a metaphorical sense. I do not wish to engage in a semantic dispute over this issue either, although it would be peculiar that so many people from so many walks of life should understand perfectly what I mean when I talk about the scientific exploration of space, and that they should themselves talk this way, if “exploration” is indeed the wrong term. In any event, scientists’ attempts to satisfy their curiosity about the universe do lead them into new areas and do motivate them to look at their collective understanding in new ways. This is all my argument needs.


Moreover, these two activities provide the natural conditions for change in science. Given that science is not complete, when it is placed in new circumstances (e.g., in dealing with significantly new phenomena, or being applied well beyond its domain), it is characteristically forced to adapt (change). The challenge of new scientific ideas is an additional factor in bringing about scientific change.[2]

From Points 6 and 7 we may conclude, therefore, that

8. Scientific exploration leads to change in our scientific views.

As I argued above, the crucial feature of science is not merely the addition of a few, or even many, interesting facts but the transformation, perhaps radical, of our views of the world[3] (cf. my remarks on Feyerabend, Galileo and the Tower Argument). This essential feature turns serendipity into a natural consequence of a dynamic science. If science is to be dynamic, it must be challenged, and it must change. But the change that matters is the transformation of our views of the universe. For once we think about the universe differently — once we have a different "communal" perception of it – we come to perceive also hitherto unknown dangers, new solutions, and new opportunities. Such is the cradle of serendipity.


Putting the conclusions of Parts 1 and 2 together, we arrive at the conclusion of the whole argument:

9. Since scientific exploration leads to change and scientific change leads to serendipity, exploration leads to serendipity.



[1] Scientists like to draw a distinction between their use of the word “theory” in science and the ordinary use of the word. In science the word is almost an honorific title given to a comprehensive set of ideas that at least begins to explain a range of phenomena; ordinary parlance betrays an empiricist bias (theory as less important than fact) and the word is almost derogatory, as in “evolution is just a theory,” meaning, “little more than a guess.” This equivocation irritates scientists, for then quantum physics and general relativity would also be “just theories.” To reduce the confusion, I keep pointing out that I am talking about comprehensive theories all along.

[2]. To put the point in a language closer to that of professional philosophers: by the “natural conditions” of change in science I mean that (disjointly) they are practically necessary and sufficient. That is, first, one or the other is normally required for scientific change to occur (overcoming the natural inertia against intellectual and experimental retooling). And second, the challenge of new circumstances characteristically forces science to change (this is a practical, not a logical certainty, for the scientific field may instead fall apart, or society may stop funding research, or a supernova may destroy the world, etc). This is not to say that science is bound to find solutions to its problems. There may be no cure for AIDS, for example, but in looking for it, researchers have profoundly transformed scientific medicine. The challenge of new ideas is often sufficient to bring about change as well (when those ideas offer significant alternative ways of looking at difficult problems, etc.).

[3]. This theory of science is developed in detail in my Radical Knowledge: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature and Limits of Science, Hackett, 1981 (Avebury in the U.K.).

Tuesday, June 1, 2010

Scientific Exploration and Serendipity

Chapter 3C

Scientific Exploration and Serendipity

2. Scientific views determine what problems, dangers, and opportunities we can be aware of.

Since our worldviews tell us what the world is like, they also determine ultimately what opportunities we can take advantage of, and what problems and dangers we can be warned about. And thus it follows that:

3. With changes of worldview come the realization of new problems, dangers and opportunities.

As we have seen above (Point 1), those changes can be profound, which means that as our science is radically transformed, so is our panorama of problems, dangers, and opportunities.


4. By becoming aware of new problems, dangers, and opportunities, we also become able to think of new solutions and new technologies.

Einstein began his career by asking "useless" theoretical questions such as "What would the universe look like if I were traveling on a ray of light?" In trying to satisfy his curiosity about this and other equally “impractical” issues he was led eventually to develop his theory of relativity and to take a decisive role in pushing physics toward quantum theory (although he later disagreed with the full-blown quantum physics of Bohr and Heisenberg). In these and other respects he changed several of our views of the world in profound ways, opening in the process the opportunity for a new understanding of light. This new understanding led to the theory of lasers. Lasers in turn opened up many technological opportunities. It was not long before some researcher decided to apply them in medicine.[1] Today lasers are used in extremely delicate surgical procedures that would not be possible with any other technology known to medical practitioners. And it all began with a change of worldview in a field far removed from medicine at the time.

In contrast imagine a crash program in Einstein's early days to have surgeons develop a surgical instrument that could do the sorts of things that a laser can do today. Is it reasonable to suppose that the point would have come when the well-funded surgeons would have realized that their aim required the overthrow of the physics of their day? And would they have then laid out the steps necessary to replace that physics with a view that would lead them to lasers, and so on? I think not. But without the new physics, could the surgeons have developed the equivalent of lasers, or of much other Western medical technology for that matter? Again I think not.

These considerations undermine the objection that all the good indirect results (e.g., the spin-offs) of the space program can be achieved by spending the money directly in the relevant areas: for benefits in one area may well require a prior radical transformation in another.


Such theoretical transformations make us aware of possible new solutions and opportunities, and that is precisely what we mean by serendipity.

Having established that:

1. Scientific views are instruments for interacting with the universe, and they tell us what the universe is like.

2. Scientific views determine what problems, dangers, and opportunities we can be aware of.

3. With changes of worldview come the realization of new problems, dangers and opportunities.

4. By becoming aware of new problems, dangers, and opportunities, we also become able to think of new solutions and new technologies.

We may then conclude that:

5. Serendipity is the natural (practically inevitable) result of scientific change.



[1] I do not mean to suggest that this process is automatic or easy. In the case of the laser, it took a maverick with a combined background in physics and engineering, Charles H. Townes, to see the possibilities. It also took a great amount of persistence on his part, in the face of profound skepticism by the profession. Charles H. Townes, “Resistance to Change and New Ideas in Physics: A Personal Perspective,” in E.B. Hook, ed., Prematurity in Scientific Discovery, California University Press, 2202, pp. 46-58.

Thursday, May 20, 2010

A Philosophical Case for the Serendipity of Science

Chapter 3B

A Philosophical Case for the Serendipity of Science

My argument has two parts. The first part establishes a strong connection between scientific change and serendipity. The second part establishes a strong connection between scientific exploration and scientific change.

The first part goes as follows.

1. Scientific views are instruments for interacting with the universe, and they tell us what the universe is like.

This statement may sound plausible, but it is by no means universally accepted. According to a still popular view, scientific knowledge is objective, objective is equated with factual, and as a result facts become the business of science. From this it presumably follows that the function of science is to collect facts about the universe, and that the function of space science is to collect them from space.

This conventional, and relatively static, picture of science makes it difficult to defend space science. If radiation from a certain region of the cosmos has been coming toward us for millions of years, and will be coming for millions more, what is the hurry to put a telescope in orbit to observe it right now?

The answer lies in a different notion of science: a notion that was first brilliantly developed by Galileo in 1632 and finally recovered by Paul Feyerabend and Thomas Kuhn in the 20th century. It is the notion that scientific views or theories are like spectacles through which we experience the universe.[1] And as Kuhn taught us, they are also instruments we use to interact with the universe.


To illustrate how far the shift on emphasis away from the collection of facts can take us, consider briefly the manner in which Galileo surmounted one of the main obstacles to Copernicus' idea of the motion of the Earth.


In his analysis of the history of science, Paul Feyerabend explains how the Aristotelians employed the Tower Argument to show that the "facts" refuted the Copernican view. Suppose, with Copernicus, that the Earth moves. If you then drop a stone from the top of a tall tower, by the time the stone hits the ground the tower will have moved with the Earth, and thus the point of impact will be a considerable distance from the base of the tower. For the impact to be as close to the base of the tower as it actually is, the stone should follow a parabolic motion. But it obviously falls straight down (Figure 3.1). Thus the supposition that the Earth moves cannot be correct.


We now know, however, that Copernicus was right: the Earth moves. But why should his view fly in the face of such obvious facts as the vertical, downward motion of the stone? As we see the stone leave the tower, we find it natural to say that the stone moves straight down. But this "natural interpretation" assumes that a normal observer under normal conditions can determine the motion of the stone. "Real" motion is presumably observable motion: a change in location that we can measure (in this case a normal observer functions as the measuring instrument: the motion of the stone is what he sees the stone do). In terms fashionable today, the Aristotelian opponents of Copernicus and Galileo assumed that motion was operational (determinable by measurement) and absolute.

Galileo's ploy, according to Feyerabend, was to offer a different set of "natural interpretations" according to which we do not actually observe the real motion of the stone. There are, Galileo explained, two components to the motion of the stone: a straight motion toward the center of the Earth and a circular motion that it shares with the earth (“circular inertia”). The stone, the tower, and the observer all share this circular inertia. But shared motion cannot be observed (when flying in a jetliner, we do not "see" the passenger in the next seat as cruising at 600 miles per hour, even though we may know that he is). Thus we can perceive neither circular inertia nor the real (compound) motion of the stone. The normal observer sees only that component of the motion of the stone that he does not share: the motion toward the center of the Earth. Therefore, concludes Galileo, the stone does not fall straight down – it only seems to.


In this manner Galileo defused one of the main objections to the Copernican view: the crucial "facts" his opponents adduced make theoretical assumptions. Certainly, Galileo points out, if we already believe that the Earth does not move, we must conclude that the motion of the stone is “straight and perpendicular.”[ii] But if we believe instead that the Earth rotates, we must conclude that the “motion would be the compound of two motions,” as well as parabolic (a “slanting movement,” Figure 3.2). What the “facts” are depends on what scientific theory we accept. Clearly, Galileo says, Aristotle, Ptolemy, and their followers “take as known that which is intended to be proved.”

Galileo’s opponents, once again, had an operational concept of motion: motion is observable change of position over time. Galileo proposed instead a concept of compound motion in which one of the components is theoretical (and in principle unobservable, since the observer shares it).[iii] He thus defused the objection, not by advancing a set of facts free of theoretical assumptions, but a set of facts with different assumptions. The new “real” motions of objects were no longer directly observable, and the relativistic basis for holding this view introduced a new way of doing physics.

Different views of the universe thus lead to different assumptions, and different assumptions lead to different evaluations of what is to count as evidence, as facts. They also lead, as in the case of the Copernican revolution, to a profound transformation of our understanding of what the world is like.

In the 19th Century, William Prout suggested that all elements are formed from hydrogen. He thus predicted that all atomic weights should be multiples of 1, since that is the atomic weight of hydrogen. But careful measurements of the atomic weights of several pure elements, chlorine for example, did not produce whole numbers. As in the case of the Tower Argument and similar experiments[iv], the seemingly impregnable facts refuted an interesting new view.

A century later, though, a new atomic theory explained that each element differs from others by the number of protons in the atomic nucleus (exactly matched by the number of electrons “around” it). The new theory, however, also proposed particles called “neutrons” in addition to protons and electrons. Neutrons, which have mass but no charge, are also located in the nucleus, but their number can vary. That is, there can be several varieties of the same element (isotopes), with different atomic weights.[v] The extremely careful 19th Century measurements of the atomic weight of pure chlorine turned out to be measurements of the mix of chlorine isotopes found in nature. The atomic weight of each of the isotopes is indeed a whole number, much in accordance with Prout’s insight. A revolutionary theory, once more, changed in this case not only the “facts” but also our understanding of what an element is.[vi]

According to Kuhn, scientific views (which he called "paradigms") tell us what elements there are in the world and what relations exist between these elements. Suppose, for example, that scientists come to view the basic components of the world as little “billiard” balls in frequent collisions. As soon as we begin to view the world in this manner, a host of new problems requires solutions. If a collision is perfectly elastic, what happens to the particles? (The system’s momentum going in must equal its momentum going out.) What happens in inelastic collisions? (Some energy will be dissipated, probably as heat.) Reasonably precise solutions to such problems are found using the laws and mathematics of a new science (e.g., Newton’s), which are tailored to the kinds of problems that arise because we think the world is made of little billiard balls.

How we view the world thus determines what sorts of problems are meaningful and what kinds of solutions are acceptable. This is, of course, a rough and preliminary way of describing science, but it suggests the sense in which we can speak of science as a pair of spectacles that permits us to see the world. I am speaking metaphorically, to be sure. But that metaphor is by no means farfetched. We should realize that without our scientific views we would simply be blind to many aspects of the universe.

Sight itself is more than a mechanism for forming mental images of the world: it is also a complex means of interaction with the world. Consider two examples. As you walk down a familiar street at night you vaguely make out in front of you some amorphous shapes. Suddenly you hear the nasty growl of an attack dog, and almost instantly one of the amorphous shapes turns into the well defined, and frightening, body of a Doberman. The threat we hear informs and changes what we see.

In a famous experiment, F.P. Kilpatrick invited subjects to look at two rooms through peepholes.[vii] They first looked at a normal (rectilinear) room. The next room was distorted in that the left wall was twice as long as the right, but the subjects noticed nothing unusual about it. They were then asked to touch a mark on the back wall with a long stick. Since they saw the room as normal, they also saw the back wall as parallel to the front one, and so their attempts to touch the mark did not succeed. Experimenting with the stick led them eventually to success, and as soon as they achieved it, they immediately saw the room as distorted.

These two cases illustrate how the visual cortex circuits that let us see the “properties” of objects (what people understand by visual perception) are meant for flexible interaction with our environment. Another, faster circuit allows us to react almost instantly without even making “pictures” of the object. A professional tennis player, for instance, will react to the flight of the ball even before consciously seeing the ball[viii]. And animals that live in completely different environments emphasize completely different senses and the brain structures that support them. Bats use sonar, and some fish electric fields. In general, animals perceive as they do because their senses were of practical advantage to their ancestors as they interacted with the world.

Scientific views also give us more than pictures or representations of the universe. Like magnified senses, they provide means of interacting with the universe, for they ask questions by seeing, probing, and touching nature at many different energies and magnitudes. Thus when we learn to "see" the universe we actually learn to make contact and deal with its diverse facets in many different ways.[ix]

This interactive view of science is controversial amongst philosophers, and it may sound strange to scientists who believe that the facts always decide the worth of scientific ideas, never the other way around. But it receives strong support from the history and the practice of science (especially at crucial scientific junctures, such as Galileo’s defusing of the Tower Argument, where the facts we choose depend on the theories we favor), as I have argued elsewhere.[x] The point of this excursion into a central controversy in the philosophy of science is that scientific exploration in general, and space exploration in particular, creates circumstances that force science into such crucial junctures. Exploration thus, as we will see below, makes inevitable the radical transformation of the ways we “see” and interact with the universe.

I place quotation marks around see to prevent a pointless but surprisingly common misinterpretation of the approach under discussion. Some philosophers take this interactionism to imply that with changes of worldview come changes in the actual visual perception of the world. Sometimes this may happen: expectation does affect perception and different theories may set up different expectations. But it need not happen in the cases when we are trying to decide between two theories. Galileo saw the stone fall straight down, just as the Aristotelians did. And Prout and his critics all saw the same numbers on their instruments. Same perceptions but different facts. Galileo’s argument destroyed not only the empiricist distinction between theory and fact, but also the empiricist connection between perception and fact.

Nevertheless, this is not a book about the limitations of empiricist theories of science. My intent is rather to apply and illustrate the findings of the interactionist approach to the nature of science. I trust that those applications and illustrations will best show the worth of such findings.[xi] In any event, with those findings in mind, our problem of justifying space exploration will take on an entirely new light as we place emphasis on the essential transformations of science and their consequences.



[1]. The most important references in this regard are: Paul K. Feyerabend, Against Method, NLB (1975); Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago Press (2nd. Edition, 1970); Imre Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Cambridge University Press (1978); Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Hutchinson (1959).

[ii] This and the following quotations from Galileo come from his Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, Modern Library of Science, edition of 2001.p. 162. The original was published in 1632. On p. 198, Galileo restates the argument. One ought to say, he claims, that

If the earth is fixed, the rock leaves from rest and descends vertically; but if the earth moves, the stone, being likewise moved with equal velocity, leaves not from rest but from a state of motion equal to that of the earth. With this it mixes its supervening downward motion, and compounds out of them a slanting movement.

[iii] From a spaceship today we could see the parabolic motions of falling objects, but this option was neither practically nor rhetorically available to Galileo. And, at any rate, as long as the observer shares the rotation of the Earth, the real motion of the falling rocks would remain in principle unobservable to him.

[iv] Galileo proposed many experiments, some with cannon balls, to arrive at the same conclusion of the Tower Argument: that the Earth could not move. That is, he made the opponents’ position even stronger than his actual opponents had, and then demonstrated that such a position was question begging. “Second Day,” op. cit.

[v] Prout proposed his idea in 1815. By the early 1900s, Hantaro Nagaoka had proposed a “Saturn” model of the atom and Lord Kelvin and J.J. Thompson had defended the “plum-pudding” model. It was not until 1911, though, that Ernest Rutherford’s idea of an atomic nucleus that contained both protons and electrons could perhaps begin to support Prout’s hypothesis. The discovery of the neutron, the full understanding of isotopes, and the full retrospective vindication of Prout would have to wait until James Chadwick’s experimental results in 1932. A very readable account appears in D. Lincoln’s Understanding the Universe: From Quarks to the Cosmos, World Scientific Publishing Co., 2004.

[vi] Lakatos offers a particularly interesting philosophical account of this and similar incidents. Op. cit.

[vii] Kilpatrick used three rooms, but I am describing only part of the experiment. Explorations in Transactional Psychology, New York University Press, 1961.

[viii] S. Blackmore, Consciousness, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 38-39.

[ix] For a more detailed account see my Evolution and the Naked Truth, Ashgate, 1998. For a converging view from the psychology of perception see Victor S. Johnston’s Why We Feel: The Science of Human Emotions, Perseus Books, 1999.

[x] In addition to the works mentioned in the notes above, including of course Galileo’s, I would suggest reading two of my papers that summarize many of the main arguments: “A Réhabilitation of Paul Feyerabend,” which can be found in The Worst Enemy of Science? Essays in Memory of Paul Feyerabend, which I edited with John Preston and David Lamb for Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 58-79, and “Conquering Feyerabend’s Conquest of Abundance,” Philosophy of Science, 69 (September 2002) pp. 519-535.

[xi] This situation mirrors the process by which Galileo’s view, the Copernican theory, came to be accepted. Such a process is best explained within an evolutionary and neurobiological perspective of the nature of science. For an account of that perspective see Evolution and the Naked Truth, op. cit.

Saturday, May 15, 2010

Science and Serendipity

CHAPTER 3

THE PHILOSOPHY OF EXPLORATION

Science and Serendipity

Neither history, nor economics, nor the natural sciences seem to provide us with a solid argument for the exploration of space, but I believe that philosophy of science can. One of the main purposes of philosophy of science is to analyze the nature of science, and the issue before us is whether there is something about the nature of science that creates the conditions for serendipity. For if serendipity is a natural consequence of science, then science will be practical in a very profound way, and we will have an answer to the concerns of the social critics. As I will argue, this philosophical answer will also allow us to meet the most crucial ideological objections.


The notion that science is deeply useful or practical captivated some of the early philosophical supporters of scientific investigation, men like Francis Bacon in England (1620) and René Descartes in France (1637).

Descartes, whose development of analytic geometry had much to do with the eventual success of the scientific revolution, postponed the publication of his work on physics when the Church persecuted Galileo for defending views of the universe that disturbed the accepted harmony between man and God. Having to keep his research hidden, Descartes lamented, might be a grave sin against "the law that obliges us to procure the general good of mankind."[1] For as he saw it, "one might reach conclusions of great usefulness in life and discover a practical philosophy...which would show us the energy and action of fire, air, and stars, the heavens, and all other bodies in our environment, as distinctly as we know the various crafts of our artisans."[2] Once in possession of that knowledge we may apply it, as we apply those crafts, "to all appropriate uses and thus make ourselves masters and owners of nature."[3]


Descartes’ suggestive view, like Bacon’s, fails to meet the challenge I have undertaken in this essay: invoking it begs the question against the ideological critics, for it assumes what they most vehemently disagree with – that if we wish to procure the good of mankind we should practice science. Furthermore, it does not show us how scientific exploration and serendipity are related. It is clear, then, that we need a new argument.



[1]. Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method, in Descartes’s Philosophical Writings, translated and edited by E. Anscombe and P.T. Geach, published by Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1969, p. 46. For some passages from the Discourse quoted below, I will favor the translation by H.S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, Vol. I, Cambridge University Press, 1972.

[2]. Ibid.

[3]. Ibid.

Sunday, May 2, 2010

Serendipity of Exploration

The Dimming of Starlight

Chapter 2k

Serendipity


A supporter may respond that a crucial aspect of his case has not been presented adequately. All those benefits he proudly mentions are the results of having yielded earlier to the call of the heavens. When humans first explored, we did not know for certain that so many good consequences would repay our efforts; very often we had no inkling. The pursuit of scientific exploration pays because of the serendipity of science; that is, because of the unintended benefits that science yields. This realization, the supporter thinks, should make us share his faith in the future of exploration and believe with him in the continuous flow of treasure from our space ships, even when he cannot say what that treasure will be.

The critics, however, may doubt that the prior performance of the space program is enough warrant for that faith. Having gotten water out of a well before does not guarantee an inexhaustible supply. Even space activities near Earth, which are often beneficial because of the vantage point they provide, are beginning to experience problems of saturation. Geosynchronous orbit, for example, is becoming crowded with communication satellites that are beginning to interfere with each other. And space debris – mostly from the breakup of rockets – is becoming a hazard to operations in lower orbits.[1] Advances in technology will probably solve these problems, but we still can see that linear growth of benefits is not automatic.


Furthermore, he evidence for serendipity becomes more tenuous the farther we go away from Earth. Critics may wonder what link exists between a probe of Jupiter's atmosphere and the lot of those who breathe Earth’s atmosphere. Moreover, although the history of science offers some striking instances of serendipity – for example, the 19th century Scottish physicist James Clerk Maxwell’s research on electromagnetism made possible television and computers, two inventions which Maxwell himself could not have foreseen – anecdotes make for a very one-sided historical analysis, for little is ever said about the overwhelming majority of the research carried out during the 19th century. Did all of that science yield practical benefits, or only the most exceptional science, as Maxwell’s surely was?

Even if critics grant that there is a strong connection between exceptional science and serendipity, supporters still have to show that the research they propose will prove to be exceptional. Or else they have to show that serendipity is a feature of most science. If they cannot show either, their standard case will have the ironic consequence of exposing the heart of space exploration to the narrow-minded whims of cost-benefit analysis. That is hardly the stuff dreams are made of.[2]

Furthermore, as far as many social critics are concerned, there is another serious objection: if spinoffs are so valuable, does it not make more sense to spend the money directly in the relevant fields?

THE SUPPORTERS' NEXT MOVE


How could the supporters begin to address these objections? They need an argument to show that, because of its nature, scientific exploration makes serendipity somehow inevitable. Does such an argument exist? It does. I will provide it in the following chapter and defend it in the rest of the book.



[1]. Orbital Debris, NASA CP-2360.

[2]. Until now NASA has had a policy of bringing about technological breakthroughs with each new mission. Because of budgetary constraints that policy apparently will change. Many future missions will depend on a recycling of existing technology. It seems that the scientific exploration of space need not drive space technology substantially anymore. The impact of the esoteric technology used to explore Jupiter and Saturn on the general technology cannot be discounted, but estimating that impact precisely, or even approximately, is not an easy matter, as previous remarks indicate.